It is important to understand the factors that in ‡uence a country's transition from the production of low-quality to high-quality products since the production of high-quality goods is often viewed as a pre-condition for export success and, ultimately, for economic development. In this paper, we provide the …rst evidence that countries' import tari¤s a¤ect the rate at which they upgrade the quality of their products. We analyze the e¤ect of import competition on quality upgrading using highly disaggregated export data to the U.S. from …fty-six countries in 10,000 products using a novel approach to measure quality. As predicted by recent distance to the frontier models, we …nd that lower tari¤s are associated with quality upgrading for products close to the world quality frontier, whereas lower tari¤s discourage quality upgrading for products distant from the frontier.
Introduction
There is substantial evidence to suggest that …rms in high income countries produce and export higher quality goods than those in less-developed nations (e.g., Schott 2004 , Hummels and Klenow 2005 , Hallak 2006 . While these studies inform our understanding of the determinants of quality within a cross-section, they do not examine how countries transition from the production of low-quality to high-quality products. This question is important, since the production of high quality products is often viewed as a pre-condition for export success and, ultimately, for economic development (Kremer 1993, Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . In this paper, we provide the …rst evidence that import tari¤s in the importing country a¤ect the rate at which they upgrade the quality of their products.
We analyze the e¤ect of import competition on quality upgrading using highly disaggregated data on exports to the U.S. from …fty-six countries in 10,000 products. We infer the quality of these products using a novel approach developed in . In contrast to previous approaches that use unit values as proxies for quality, we estimate quality using both prices and quantity information, where, conditional on price, higher quality is assigned to products with higher market shares. This approach has the advantage of accounting for di¤erences in quality-adjusted manufacturing costs (e.g., wages) that could explain variation in prices. We match these quality estimates to detailed import tari¤ data for the countries'home markets. The tari¤s provide a measure of the import competition in these countries.
To guide our empirical analysis, we draw on the theoretical literature in industrial organization that analyzes competition and innovation. 1 Although both competition and innovation are much broader concepts than the focus of our analysis, quality upgrading is one important element of innovation, and trade liberalization is one policy tool that stimulates competition in product markets. For example, according to widespread evidence, tari¤ reductions lead to pro-competitive pressures in the liberalizing countries that result in both resource reallocation and lower markups. 2 We draw on models by Aghion and Howitt (2005) , Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th, and Howitt (henceforth, ABBGH, 2005) , and Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt, and Prantil (henceforth, ABGHP, 2009 ) that allow the relationship between competition and innovation to depend on the distance of the product to the world technology frontier. 3 These models highlight two forces. First, for …rms far from the technology frontier, an increase in competition reduces incentives to innovate 1 Recent work by Verhoogen (2008) and Bustos (2011) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that access to destination markets increases the incentive for …rms to improve the quality of their products. Since our context focuses on the impact of competition within a country's home market, we turn to models by Aghion and coauthors. 2 For instance, see Levinsohn (1993) , Pavcnik (2002) , Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) , and the comprehensive survey article by Tybout (2003) . 3 Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) also show that policies that initially facilitate growth could in fact inhibit growth at later stages of economic development. because ex post rents from innovation are eroded by new entrants as in Schumpeter's appropriability argument. As …rms approach the frontier, however, competition can increase incentives to innovate because it reduces …rms'pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces their post-innovation rents. We refer to this force as the escape competition e¤ect. These models, therefore, nest predictions of both positive and negative e¤ects of competition on the innovative activity of …rms. 4 The empirical strategy we adopt examines the relationship between the change in quality of products over …ve-year intervals and the …ve-year lagged tari¤ levels across many countries between 1990 and 2005. The high level of disaggregation of both the tari¤ and the quality measures allow us to isolate the e¤ects of import tari¤s from other factors that could potentially a¤ect quality. We include product-year …xed e¤ects to account for product-speci…c productivity shocks or changes in consumer demand, and we include country-year …xed effects to account for changes in countries'relative endowments of skilled workers or changes in countries'institutional structures. To assess the nonmonotonic relationship hypothesized in recent theories, we allow the relationship between tari¤s and quality upgrading to depend on the proximity of the product to the world quality frontier.
Our analysis generates a number of new …ndings. One, we demonstrate the importance of including controls for country-speci…c variables that could be correlated with import tari¤s. In a linear speci…cation between quality change and tari¤s, we show that omitting country-year …xed e¤ects ‡ips the sign on the tari¤ coe¢ cient and can therefore lead to incorrect conclusions about the association between these two variables. With the controls, we …nd a negative relationship between tari¤s and quality upgrading, which suggests that lower tari¤s result in faster quality upgrading. 5 Two, we provide strong evidence in support of a nonmonotonic relationship. We show that low import tari¤s promote quality upgrading of products that are initially close to the world technology frontier, whereas lower tari¤s discourage quality upgrading of products that are distant from the world frontier. Three, we …nd that this nonmonotonic relationship holds across countries that span a wide income distribution, provided that the country has reached a minimum level of institutional quality. 6 This result is intuitive, given that, in countries with multi-dimensional sources of market frictions, changes in import tari¤s are likely to have limited e¤ects on the competitive 4 Hart (1983) argues, for instance, that competition will reduce managerial slack, while Schumpeter (1943) suggests the appropriability e¤ect would reduce incentives to innovate. These models suggest behavioral changes within …rms. Heterogeneous …rm models based on Melitz (2003) also suggest that average export quality could rise in response to trade liberalization because the less-productive …rms are driven out of the market. While selection may be one mechanism, we note that it cannot explain the nonmonotonic results that we …nd, which are consistent with the models by Aghion and coauthors. 5 That is, without the additional controls one would conclude support for Shumpeterian models while with the controls, the results are supportive of the pro-competitive models, such as Hart (1983) or Melitz (2003) . 6 As discussed in more detailed below, we rely on the World Bank's Doing Business Report to infer a country's business climate.
pressures faced by domestic …rms. Thus, the results suggest that a minimum institutional "quality" may be needed for the mechanisms of the model to operate. The results are robust to speci…cations that deal with potential endogeneity concerns regarding the tari¤s, including using worldwide export growth as a proxy for productivity shocks and using the end of the Multi…ber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005 as a natural experiment which resulted in shocks to certain textile and clothing products in which China had binding quotas.
Our paper builds on and contributes to a number of literatures. The international trade literature on quality has established that improved market access can promote quality upgrading. Verhoogen (2008) shows that exporters upgrade quality in response to a currency depreciation in Mexico, while Bustos (forthcoming) …nds that a regional free-trade agreement lead Argentine …rms to invest in new technologies. Both papers have identi…ed an important channel that a¤ects quality upgrading, but neither of the papers focuses on the competition mechanism at the core of our analysis. 7 The international trade literature on tari¤s and productivity has shown a positive relationship between tari¤s and total factor productivity (see Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007; and Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) for …rm-level studies within countries, and Romalis (2007) for a cross-country analysis). In our paper, we focus on quality upgrading, which may be viewed as a speci…c component of TFP, and for the …rst time allow for the potential nonmonotonic relationship to depend on the proximity to the world quality frontier using tari¤s as the competition measure. Our results highlight that the distance from the world frontier is important for understanding a country's performance following trade liberalization.
Our paper is also related to studies in industrial organization that examine the relationship between competition, such as foreign entry or regulation, on related but distinct outcomes, such as research and development, patents, or total factor productivity. These studies have found support for the hypothesized nonmonotonic relationship, either using aggregate cross-country analysis (Vandenbussche et al. 2004 and Acemoglu et al. 2006) , or industry studies within one country (e.g., ABBGH, 2005; ABGHP, 2009) . Our paper di¤ers from these studies in a number of ways. First, the various competition measures (e.g., delicensing, FDI policy, Lerner indices) and outcome measures (e.g., patents, citations, TFP, etc) used across these studies make it di¢ cult to draw general conclusions. Here, we use quality and tari¤ measures that are comparable over time and space, which allows us to make comparisons across countries. Moreover, because of the high level of disaggregation, we can maintain the advantages of industry-level studies, which can better isolate how changes in economic environments a¤ect outcomes, while maintaining a broad set of countries that span the income distribution.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the distance to frontier models that serve as the basis for our empirical speci…cation. In Section 3, we outline our empirical strategy and the methodology used to infer product quality. In Section 4, we present the results, and in Section 5, we conclude.
Theoretical Background
Aghion and Howitt (2005) provide an overview of a number of models that analyze how competition a¤ects innovation, which we will draw on for our empirical analysis. The key insight behind these models is that the relationship hinges critically on the incumbents' position relative to the world technology frontier. The basic intuition behind this class of models can be illustrated using one of the simpler models in ABGHP(2009). The model assumes there are two …rms capable of producing an innovation for each intermediate input under Bertrand competition. In each period and in each of the intermediate sectors, there is a potential entrant who can pay an entry cost to enter. If entry occurs, it takes place at the frontier; the entrant captures the entire market and becomes the new leading …rm. Because the entrant observes the post-innovation technology, it would not pay the entry cost if the incumbent was at the frontier after innovation since Bertrand competition would drive pro…ts to zero. The incumbent laggard never invests in innovation because at best it would catch up to its rival and earn zero pro…ts. In this model, the cost of entry is an exogenous parameter that determines the extent of competition faced by the incumbents.
ABGHP show that increasing competition reduces innovation if the …rm is far from the frontier because of a "discouragement" or "appropriability" e¤ect. That is, …rms far from the frontier know they cannot survive increased competition even if they successfully innovate. As a result, any policies that promote competition (e.g., lowering the entry cost) will discourage these lagging …rms from spending resources on innovation. In contrast, policies that increase the threat of competition stimulate innovative activity for …rms at the technology frontier. The reason is that successful innovation enables the incumbent leader to escape from the the threat of entry. ABGHP refer to this as the "escape-entry" e¤ect. That is, leading incumbent …rms can avoid losses that would result from increased competition by successful innovation. Thus, the implications of the model are that the relationship between innovation and competition will depend, in a nonmonotonic way, on …rms'proximity to the world technology frontier: innovation = f (competition; proximity to the frontier ):
(1)
The assumptions can vary across these models. For example, the model in AHHV (2001) does not feature entry but instead focuses on the incentives to innovate among existing …rms as product market competition (e.g., through anti-trust policy) changes. Nevertheless, the core insight that generates the nonmonotonic hypotheses is a distinct feature of this class of models that we use to guide our empirical speci…cation.
Empirical Speci…cation
We explore whether the nonmonotonic relationship hypothesized between competition and innovation holds for import competition and quality upgrading. We begin by describing both measures used in the analysis.
Import Competition
To measure a country's import competition, we collect disaggregated import tari¤s for each country in our sample. The tari¤ data are obtained from WITS and are speci…ed at the HS 6-digit level and over time. That is, we measure the import competition faced by an HS 6-digit industry in South Korea by South Korea's tari¤s on imports in that industry. The advantage of using tari¤s as our measure for competition within a country is that they are readily available at a disaggregated level and comparable across countries and time. 8 Importantly, there is widespread evidence that tari¤ reductions result in pro-competitive pressures in the liberalizing countries which result in both a reallocation of resources towards more competitive …rms and exit of ine¢ cient …rms, and a reduction in mark-ups.
Quality
The innovation in the theories described in Section 2 could comprise a broad range of activities, including patenting, product creation, new processes, and investments in research and development. In this paper, we focus on one element of innovative activity -product quality -using an approach developed in using export data to the United States. 9 The advantage of our approach is that we are able to extract measures of quality that are comparable across countries and over time. We rely on a country's exports to the United States rather than its production to infer quality because the trade data are available at a highly disaggregate level, which is important for our analysis, and because these data are comparable across countries and time. We are likely to capture the highest quality products within a country given the evidence that exporting …rms tend to be more productive, employ higher skilled workers, obtain more International Organization Standard (ISO) certi…cations, and produce higher unit value products relative to nonexporters (e.g., see Bernard et al., 2007; Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2008) . There is also evidence that higher unit value goods are exported to higher income countries (e.g., see Hallak, 2006; Bastos and Silva, 2009; and Manova and Zhang, 2009) , and so exports to the U.S. are likely to be among the highest quality products.
Methodology for Measuring Quality
We estimate a product's quality from both export prices and market share information, following . This is in contrast to the literature in international trade that often uses prices or unit values (value divided by quantity) as a proxy for quality (e.g., Schott, 2004; Hallak 2006) . 10 The obvious advantage of using unit values is that they are easily calculated in the trade data. However, if products possess both vertical (e.g., comfort) and horizontal (e.g., style) attributes, unit values may be inappropriate proxies for quality. For example, consider women's trousers, de…ned at the HS 10-digit level (HS 6204624020), exported to the U.S. in 2005 by India and Venezuela. The unit values (inclusive of transportation and tari¤ costs) associated with these imports were $140 and $163, respectively. Under the price-equals-quality assumption, Venezuelan trousers would be assigned higher quality. However, the income per capita of Venezuela exceeds India's by ten-fold and so it is possible that the di¤erences in unit values also re ‡ect, in part, the wage di¤erential. Our measure of quality also takes into account di¤erences in market shares; thus for two products with identical unit values, the product with a higher market share is assigned higher quality (how much higher quality depends, as seen below, on the slope of the demand schedule). Indeed, India exported over 1 million units more than Venezuela; and after accounting for these di¤erences in market shares, the methodology described below assigns a higher quality to Indian trousers, despite lower prices.
To estimate quality, we use a nested logit demand framework, based on Berry (1994) . In this framework, quality is de…ned as the vertical component of the model and has a structural de…nition as the mean valuation that U.S. consumers attach to an imported product. The intuition behind this approach is that higher quality is assigned to products that have higher market shares, conditional on prices. We closely follow the set up in and summarize the estimation procedure here.
To understand the nested logit structure, …rst we need to describe how the data are classi…ed. We de…ne products as the HS 10-digit codes, which is the most disaggregated U.S. trade data classi…cation. A U.S. import from a country within a product is called a variety. All products can be mapped into a coarser 5-digit SITC (revision 3) classi…cation code, which we refer to as the industry. For example, an industry may be men's knit shirts, and within this industry, shirts are classi…ed into products that can vary by fabric material (e.g., cotton, wool, etc.). Chinese cotton and Japanese wool shirts are examples of varieties. We use the HS 10-digit products as the nests for our application. As shown below, the nested logit allows for more plausible substitution patterns than the logit by allowing di¤erences in the correlation among consumer preferences for varieties within a nest than for varieties across nests.
We derive the structural equation for a single SITC industry, comprising many varieties, and then estimate this equation separately for each industry (thus we suppress industry subscripts). Consumer n has preferences for HS product h imported from country c (i.e., variety ch) at time t. The consumer purchases the one variety that provides her with the highest indirect utility, given by
The terms represent the variety's valuation that is common across consumers (notice that these terms are not subscripted by n). The …rst term, 1;ch , is the time-invariant valuation that the consumer attaches to variety ch. The second term, 2;t , controls for secular time trends common across all varieties. The 3;cht term is a variety-time deviation from the …xed e¤ect that consumers observe but that we as econometricians do not. Consequently, this last component of quality is potentially correlated with the variety's unit value inclusive of transportation and tari¤ costs, p cht . The horizontal component of the model is captured by the random component,
The term ncht is assumed to be distributed Type-I extreme value and explains why a low-quality variety that is expensive is ever purchased. The former term interacts the common valuation that consumer n places on all varieties within product h, nht , with a dummy variable d ch that takes a value of 1 if country c's export lies in product h. This term generates the nesting framework because it allows consumer n's preferences to be more correlated for varieties within product h than for varieties across products. 11 For instance, a consumer who prefers Japanese wool shirts is more likely to prefer other wool shirts rather than cotton shirts. The nested logit is designed to capture this preference structure.
An outside-variety completes the demand system. The outside option allows consumers to choose a domestically produced variety instead of any imported variety. The consumer chooses this outside option if the utility derived from the outside variety exceeds that from 1 1 As discussed in Berry (1994 ), Cardell (1997 has shown that the distribution of P H h=1 nht d ch is the unique distribution such that if is distributed extreme value, then the sum is also distributed type-I extreme value. The degree of within nest correlation is controlled by 2 (0; 1] and is assumed to be identical across all products. As approaches one, the correlation in consumer tastes for varieties within a nest approaches one; as tends to zero, the nested logit converges to the standard logit model. purchasing any inside option. The utility of the outside variety is given by
The mean utility of the outside variety is normalized to zero; this normalization anchors the valuations of the inside varieties. In this context, one can think of the outside variety as the domestic substitute for imports, and we therefore set the outside variety market share to one minus the industry's import penetration. 12 Note that the choice of the outside variety proxy a¤ects the absolute growth rate of import qualities but not the relative growth rate because our analysis includes year …xed e¤ects that are common to all varieties. Once the outside variety market share s 0t is known, we can compute the industry size:
, where q cht denotes the import quantity of variety ch. The market shares for imported varieties are then calculated as s cht = q cht =M KT t .
The consumer chooses variety ch if V ncht > V nc 0 h 0 t . Under the distributional assumptions for the random component of consumer utility, Berry (1994) shows that the demand curve from the preferences in equation (2) is
where vs cht is variety ch's share within product h at time t (the nest share). 13 The trade data do not record detailed characteristics of varieties, so we exploit the panel dimension of the data by specifying a time-invariant component of quality ( 1;ch ) with variety …xed e¤ects, and the common quality component ( 2;t ) with year …xed e¤ects. The third component of quality, 3;cht , is not observed and plays the role of the estimation error.
Since 3;cht and the nest share are potentially correlated with the variety's price, instrumental variables are required to identify the parameters. We instrument the price with the variety's transportation costs, which are obviously correlated with prices but may also be correlated with quality if …rms ship higher quality goods in order to lower their per unit transport costs. This practice potentially raises concerns that trade costs may be correlated with a variety's quality (Hummels and Skiba, 2004) . However, the exclusion restriction remains valid as long as transport costs do not a¤ect the period-speci…c deviations ( 3;cht ) from a variety's average quality ( 1;ch ). In other words, if an Australian …rm chooses on average to export a high quality variety to the United States because of distance, the instruments remain valid as long as shocks to transportation costs do not a¤ect the deviations from the …rm's average quality choice. Indeed, the Washington Apples phenomenon discussed in Hummels and Skiba (2004) identi…es the impact of distance on prices using cross-country variation in distance rather than shocks to transport costs over time. We also include exchange rates and the interaction of distance to the United States with oil prices as additional instruments, which vary at the country-year level. Finally, vs cht is also endogenous, and so we instrument this term with the number of varieties within product h and the number of varieties exported by country c. The identi…cation assumption is that entry and exit of other varieties will be correlated with ch's share within the nest, but uncorrelated with quality shocks. This would occur in a model of monopolistic competition where all varieties are atomistic, or in an oligopoly model where entry and exit decisions occur in the …rst stage and Nash prices and qualities are chosen in the second stage of the game. 14 A second issue that arises in estimating (4), …rst noted by Feenstra (1994) and also by Hallak and Schott (2008) , is the problem of unobserved or "hidden"varieties. To understand how hidden varieties could confound the measurement of quality, suppose that the reason India exported far more women's trousers than Venezuela was simply that India exported more unobserved twelve-digit HS varieties (for instance, more colors). If the Venezuelan and Indian varieties were identically priced with equal market share, then when aggregating to the observed ten-digit HS level, we would assign a larger market share to the Indian varieties. From equation (4), India's estimated quality would be biased upward simply due to the hidden varieties. Drawing on standard models (e.g., Krugman, 1980) that predict that the number of varieties produced is increasing in a country's population, we use (the log of) population as an additional covariate in (4). 15 The demand curve that controls for the hidden-varieties problem is given by
where pop ct is the population in country c at time t. The estimated parameters and the residual of the regression de…ne the quality of variety ch at time t as:
From equation (5), we see that the quality of an imported variety is de…ned relative to its market share after controlling for exporter size and price. More generally, our notion of quality is an attribute that allows a variety's price to rise without it losing market share. One potential concern about this interpretation is that many factors unrelated to quality could a¤ect market shares and therefore confound our measure of quality. However, it is important to note that this set of factors is made much smaller by conditioning on prices. For example, a variety may have a large market share if the exporting country is geographically close to the United States. However, since the price includes transportation costs the quality estimate is not capturing purely gravity e¤ects such as distance. We note that de…ning quality to be inclusive of a residual is analogous to the productivity literature that interprets total factor productivity as the residual from conditioning output on observable inputs. A regression of cht on year …xed e¤ects yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.01, and adding the variety …xed e¤ects increases the adjusted R-squared to 0.77. This implies that the residual (^ 3;cht ) accounts for 23 percent of the variation in the quality estimate.
Proximity to Frontier
We estimate equation (5) separately for each 5-digit SITC (revision 3) industry and use the estimated parameters of the regressions to de…ne the qualities according to (6). 16 We construct the frontier measures by …rst taking a monotonic transformation of the quality measures to ensure that all qualities are non-negative:
We de…ne a variety's proximity to the frontier as the ratio of its (transformed) quality to the highest quality within each HS 10-digit product:
where the max operator chooses the maximum F cht within a product-year and P F cht 2 (0; 1]. For varieties close to the frontier, this measure is close to one. For varieties far from the frontier, this measure is close to zero.
Data Description
To estimate quality, we use annual export data to the U.S. from 1990 to 2005 at the HS 10-digit level for the manufacturing sector (SITC 5-8). Since unit values are notoriously noisy (GAO, 1995) , prior to estimating the demand systems in equation (5), we trim the data along three dimensions: we drop variety-year observations above or below the 1st and 99th percentile of unit values, exclude varieties with annual price increases of more than 200 percent or price declines of more than 66 percent, and drop varieties with export quantities of fewer than ten. The quality estimates obtained from equation (6) are also noisy and so we trim the qualities at the 5th and 95th percentiles. We also drop any observations with …ve-year quality growth outside the 1st and 99th percentiles. We trim along …ve year intervals since our dependent variable below will be de…ned as quality growth over 5-year intervals.
We obtain six-digit HS import tari¤s for …fty-six countries for 1990, 1995, and 2000 from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. The sample of countries is limited by the availability of tari¤ data for those years. 17 There is wide variation in the tari¤ levels across countries and over time. The average tari¤ across countries range from very low rates of 0 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore, and 5 percent in Norway to very high rates of 100 percent in Bangladesh and 63 percent in Morocco and Pakistan. Between 1990 and 2000, average tari¤s for OECD countries fell from 16 percent to 12 percent, whereas for non-OECD countries they fell from 29 percent to 18 percent. The world quality frontier for each product in each year is de…ned from the set of countries for which we have tari¤ data. The proximity to the frontier for each country's products in each year is then matched to its import tari¤s. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the change in quality, proximity to frontier, and tari¤ levels for OECD and non-OECD countries, 18 as well as statistics for countries classi…ed as having strong and weak business environments, high DB and low DB, which we de…ne below. The table shows that non-OECD countries have faster quality growth than OECD countries, and higher rates of protection. The table also shows that non-OECD countries have slightly higher proximity to frontier measures than OECD countries, but this is related to product composition. Controlling for product-year …xed e¤ects, there is a positive and statistically signi…cant correlation between proximity to the frontier and income per capita.
As would be expected, the quality estimates indicate that richer countries export higher quality varieties within products. 19 Thus, on average, more advanced countries sit atop 1 7 If tari¤ data were unavailable for a particular year, we included the data for the preceding year. Note that tari¤s are common for all countries within the European Union.
1 8 OECD countries include all those that joined the OECD before our sample period in 1990. Countries in our sample that joined the OECD after 1990 include Mexico in 1994, and South Korea and Poland in 1996. Taiwan is a member but cannot vote.
1 9 This is shown in and is consistent with …ndings in the previous literature. a product's quality ladder, while developing countries are further from the frontier. The relationship between income and quality in 2005 is depicted in Figure 1 . The left panel of Figure 1 plots the proportion of the total number of products a country exports for which it is the quality "leader", P F cht = 1, against its income per capita, showing there is a positive and statistically signi…cant relationship. 20 Similarly, there is a positive relationship between income and the fraction of the highest-priced varieties in the right panel of the …gure. Notice in this panel that the positive relationship is steeper than with the quality-based measure. It is clear from the graph that China is an outlier -although China exported the highestpriced variety in 9 percent of products in 2005, the quality-based measure indicates that China was the leader in 44 percent of the total number of products it exported to the U.S. There are several reasons for this discrepancy. First, although China exports lowpriced varieties, it has exceptionally high market shares (it has the highest quantity in 59 percent of the products it exports), particularly for labor-intensive products. That is, the procedure above yields high quality estimates for China because its market shares are larger than the predicted market shares given its price and the estimated elasticity of demand. Thus, the methodology will record higher quality for China in these products. Second, trade statistics are recorded on a total value basis rather than a value-added basis. Given the importance of processing trade for Chinese exports, its value added will vary across sectors. For example, the Apple iPod is "made in China"even though China's value added accounts for a fraction of the production (Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2007) . More generally, Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) estimate that China's value added in computers may be as low as 5 percent. If the U.S. Census collected value-added trade data, China's inferred quality would presumably be much lower. Note that in Section 5.3, we will adopt several robustness checks in our analysis, including using unit values as a proxy for quality, and excluding China from the analysis and the frontier de…nition.
Before turning to the estimation, we preview the data to see how the quality distribution changes with tari¤s over time without imposing functional forms on the relationship. For varieties close to the quality frontier, we would expect that quality growth would be relatively higher in a low-tari¤ environment compared to those in a high-tari¤ environment. In contrast, for varieties distant to the quality frontier, we would expect that quality growth would be relatively lower in a low tari¤ environment compared to those in a high tari¤ environment. To check for this, we plot the di¤erence in the quality growth for low tari¤ versus high tari¤s dividing the data into twenty bins of the proximity to frontier measure. High tari¤s are de…ned as those above the mean and low tari¤s as those below the mean, and we de-mean the quality estimates to make them comparable across products and time by regressing quality growth on country-year and product-year …xed e¤ects and obtaining the residual. Figure 2 shows an upward sloping curve, with negative relative growth for varieties distant from the frontier and positive relative growth for varieties close to the frontier. This implies that the quality distribution for low tari¤ varieties spreads out over time relative to high-tari¤ environments. Indeed, the standard deviation of quality growth in low-tari¤ environments is 0.69 compared to 0.63 in high-tari¤ environments.
Quality Upgrading and Import Competition Results
With the import tari¤s and quality measures in hand, we can analyze the e¤ect of competition on quality upgrading, allowing for the discouragement and escape-competition forces. We use the following empirical speci…cation to relate quality growth to import tari¤s, proximity to the frontier, and the interaction of the two, which allows for the nonmonotonic relationship highlighted in ABGHP (2009): 21 ln F cht = ht + ct + 1 P F cht 5 + 2 tari¤ ch;t 5 + 3 (P F ch;t 5 tari¤ ch;t 5 ) + " cht . (8) The dependent variable, ln F cht , is the change in a variety's quality between period t and t 5: All the explanatory variables are in levels for the period t 5. Our speci…cation includes both product-year …xed e¤ects ( ht ) and country-year …xed e¤ects ( ct ) which are critical to the analysis. The product-year …xed e¤ects deal with two issues. One, because the qualities are estimated separately across industries, the quality estimates are only comparable within the industry or product. Including the product-year e¤ects ensures that the estimation only exploits the variation between comparable qualities. Two, product-year …xed e¤ects control for shocks that are common to all varieties within a product such as demand shocks or world-wide technology shocks that could also in ‡uence quality upgrading. The country-year …xed e¤ects sweep out country-level shocks such as technological shocks, changes in relative endowments, and changes in institutions that a¤ect competition. Thus, this speci…cation ‡exibly controls for di¤erent shocks that may be correlated with tari¤ changes and a¤ect quality growth. The ABGHP model suggest that 2 > 0 and 3 < 0. Thus, a fall in tari¤s would spur a variety's quality growth in subsequent periods only if the product variety is close to the world quality frontier (P F cht 5 close to 1); this is consistent with the escape competition e¤ect discussed above. In contrast, if a product variety's quality is a long way from the frontier, a fall in tari¤s could reduce quality upgrading due to the discouragement e¤ect. That is, products a long way from the frontier need high tari¤s to protect rents in order to promote quality upgrading. Note that 1 < 0 implies that varieties that are far from the frontier (P F cht 5 close to 0) experience faster quality upgrading, implying convergence in quality.
Baseline Results
Before estimating equation (8), we …rst look for a monotonic relationship between competition and quality growth by regressing the growth in a variety's quality on the home market's import tari¤s and product-year …xed e¤ects, as in the trade and growth literature (e.g., Romalis, 2007) . The …rst column of Table 2 shows that a fall in tari¤s is associated with slower quality upgrading. However, once we include country-year …xed e¤ects in column 2, to control for factors such as changes in a country's relative factor endowments or technology shocks, the tari¤ coe¢ cient switches sign, and is now negative, indicating that a fall in tari¤s is associated with faster quality upgrading. Thus, the tables suggest that the relationship between import competition and quality upgrading may be confounded by unobservables. In particular, when country-year …xed e¤ects are excluded, the results support the appropriability argument in Schumpeter (1943) , but this …nding reverses in favor of arguments related to Hart (1983) once we control for country-level changes in economic environments. These results highlight the importance of controlling for country-year e¤ects that may be correlated with industry level competition measures such as tari¤s. In all subsequent regressions, we therefore include both country-year and product-year …xed e¤ects.
Next, we examine whether the relationship between quality upgrading and tari¤s depends on a variety's proximity to the frontier according to the baseline equation in (8). Column 3 shows there is a negative coe¢ cient on the lag proximity to the frontier, which implies a faster catch-up for varieties far from the frontier. The positive coe¢ cient on tari¤s and the negative coe¢ cient on the interaction of tari¤s with the proximity to frontier provide support for the e¤ects highlighted in ABGHP (2009). The negative coe¢ cient on the interaction implies that the varieties close to the world frontier are more likely to upgrade quality in response to tougher competition in the domestic market (the escape-competition e¤ect). And the positive coe¢ cient on the linear tari¤ variable implies that tari¤s are likely to have the opposite e¤ect for varieties distant from the world frontier (the discouragement e¤ect).
In column 4, we examine heterogeneity in the discouragement and escape-competition e¤ects by allowing for separate e¤ects for OECD and non-OECD countries. The results hold across both groups, but the magnitudes of the tari¤ coe¢ cients are much larger for OECD countries. For OECD varieties that are distant from the frontier (P F cht 5 close to 0), a 10 percentage point fall in tari¤s is associated with a 4.2 percent fall in quality upgrading. However, for OECD varieties close to the frontier, a fall in tari¤s has the opposite e¤ect: a 10 percentage point fall in tari¤s is associated with a 5.6 percent increase in quality upgrading. For non-OECD varieties far from the frontier, a 10 percentage point fall in tari¤s is associated with a 1.1 percent fall in quality upgrading; and for varieties close to the frontier a 10 percentage point fall in tari¤s is associated with a 1.3 percent growth in quality.
Institutions and Quality Upgrading
The results in column 4 of Table 2 raise the question as to why there are larger quality responses in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries as tari¤s change. For the e¤ects in the theory to be present, market forces need to be able to operate. In particular, the potential for entry and exit of …rms is crucial for tari¤s to invoke more competition in the home market. However, non-tari¤ barriers, bureaucratic red tape, and other entry regulations are likely to imply heterogeneity in the impact of tari¤s on the competitive environment across countries. In countries with more regulation, additional domestic reforms may be needed for lower tari¤s to induce further competition in the market.
We test for heterogenous e¤ects in the tari¤-frontier interaction coe¢ cient according to institutional quality in the …rst column of Table 3 . To assess the quality of a country's institutions, we rely on a measure of the regulatory environment from the World Bank's Doing Business Survey. 22 The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a better business environment. We separate countries into two groups, with HDB comprising countries with a doing business indicator greater than the median, and LDB comprising countries with a doing business indicator lower than the median. 23 We construct dummies for HDB and LDB countries and interact these with all the key variables. Column 1 shows that for countries with weak business environments, the magnitudes and signi…cance on the tari¤ variables are much lower than for countries with strong business environments, with the coe¢ cient on the linear tari¤ term insigni…cant.
Interestingly, the business environment indicator is picking up an e¤ect beyond di¤er-ences in income per capita. To see this, we allow for additional ‡exibility in the coe¢ cients for strong and weak business environments further broken down by OECD and non-OECD countries in the middle panel of Table 3 (columns 2a and 2b). The results indicate that even non-OECD countries characterized by strong business environments display both the discouragement and the escape-competition forces (see upper panel of column 2b). Yet, for countries characterized by weak doing business indicators the coe¢ cients on the tari¤ variables are insigni…cant on both tari¤ terms for both OECD countries and non-OECD countries, and the coe¢ cient on the tari¤ term for non-OECD countries becomes negative (see lower panel). 24 This result suggests that a minimum institutional "quality," and not 2 2 We construct an aggregate Doing Business Index by following the procedure outlined in World Bank (2005) . The Doing Business database tracks constraints along several dimensions, including the ease of starting a business, enforcing contracts, obtaining credit, hiring and …ring, etc. We compute each country's percentile ranking for each outcome. The aggregate Doing Business measure takes the (simple) average of a country's percentile rankings across the outcomes. A higher value indicates an environment more conducive to conducting business.
2 3 See Table 1 for the list of countries classi…ed as above and below the median Doing Business index. 2 4 Note that there are only two countries, Greece and Portugal, in the LDB-OECD grouping. The alterna-simply high income per capita, is required for the two forces to operate. In particular, the lack of support for the models among weaker business-climate countries appears consistent with a variant on the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) model that discusses how political economy factors can inhibit the escape-competition e¤ect from operating (see section 5.2 of Acemoglu et al., 2006) . Since countries with poorer business climates are unlikely to …t the theory, we restrict the subsequent analysis to the set of countries characterized by a relatively stronger business environment.
In column 3, we therefore reestimate equation (8) with only the sample of countries with business environments above the median. The results indicate that for varieties far from the frontier, a 10 percentage point fall in tari¤s is associated with a 5.2 percent decline in quality growth, while an equivalent tari¤ decline for varieties close to the frontier is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in quality growth. To get a sense of the economic signi…cance of these point estimates, we evaluate what a 10 percentage point change in tari¤s implies for varieties close to the frontier and for those distant from the frontier, and compare these predicted changes to the actual change in quality for these varieties. Thus, for varieties close to the frontier (P F > 0:9); the predicted mean change in quality is 3 percent, whereas the actual mean change in quality for these varieties is 13 percent. This calculation implies that a 10 percentage point change in tari¤s can account for around 20 percent of the actual change in quality. An analogous calculation for varieties distant from the frontier (P F < 0:1), implies that a 10 percentage point change in tari¤s can account for around 10 percent of the actual change in quality. Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the relationship between competition and quality upgrading for the set of countries with strong business environments, highlighting the discouragement and escape-competition e¤ects in column 3 of Table 3 . The …gure plots the predicted quality growth ln^ F cht =^ 1 P F cht 5 +^ 2 tari¤ cht 5 +^ 3 (P F cht 5 tari¤ cht 5 ) against the P F cht 5 ; evaluated at the 5th (dashed line) and 95th tari¤ percentiles. The downward sloping lines indicate convergence in the data; varieties far from the frontier experience faster quality upgrading than those that are proximate to the frontier. The predicted quality growth line evaluated at the 95th percentile tari¤ (a 20 percent tari¤) is a clock-wise rotation of the 5th percentile tari¤ (a 0 percent tari¤), and this re ‡ects the two forces. For varieties far from the frontier, moving from a high tari¤ to a low tari¤ is associated with a decrease in the rate of quality upgrading, which is consistent with the Schumpeterian discouragement e¤ect. However, for varieties close to the frontier, moving tive OECD group, with all current members, would add Mexico to that subgroup, which results in signi…cant tari¤ terms. One explanation for this …nding is that the busines climate in the maquiladora region of Mexico, where the majority of Mexico's exports to the U.S. originate, are not accurately re ‡ected in the DB measure. More importantly, the results for all the other three groupings are una¤ected by the OECD de…nition.
from a high to a low tari¤ is associated with a faster rate of quality upgrading, which illustrates the escape-competition e¤ect.
Robustness
In the remaining tables, we check the robustness of the results to additional controls. One potential concern is that the proximity variable is measured with error due to randomness or outliers of the highest quality variety. In Table 4 , we demonstrate that our results are robust to alternative measures of the world frontier. In column 1, we check the sensitivity of the results by excluding varieties at the world frontier (and so exclude observations for which P F cht 5 = 1). In column 2, we drop the top 2 varieties and rede…ne the frontier in equation (7) using the third highest quality variety, rather than the maximum. In column 3, we rede…ne the frontier based on the sample of varieties exported by HDB countries. We next rede…ne the frontier using qualities inferred from the data set after excluding China's exports. Recall that in Section 4, we noted that China's export quality may be overstated because the U.S. import data record gross values rather than value added. To check that our results are not driven by this, we exclude China's exports to the U.S. from the data, reestimate quality using equation (5), and rede…ne the proximity to frontier measures excluding China. In column 4, we report the baseline speci…cation using these (China-excluded) quality measures. Across all four columns, the results remain robust to these alternative measures of the world frontier.
An alternative way to construct the quality measures is to compute the percentile of a variety's quality within each product-year pair. The advantage of using the quality percentile, as opposed to the actual measure of quality, is that the variety's ranking is easier to compare across products. Re-running the baseline speci…cation with the change in quality percentile as the dependent variable also has the additional advantage of not being a function of the lag proximity measure on the right hand side of the regression (we discuss this further below). Column 5 indicates that the results are robust to this alternative measure. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the proximity to frontier falls as expected (but is still negative indicating that it captures convergence), and the signs of the coe¢ cients on tari¤s and the interaction remain unchanged from the baseline speci…cation.
In column 6, we reestimate equation (8) using prices (unit values), the more common proxy for quality in international trade. 25 Speci…cally, we de…ne the proximity to the frontier based on how far a variety's price is from the maximum price, and de…ne the dependent variable as the change in log prices. 26 Column 5 shows that the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are similar to our baseline estimates; for varieties close to the unit value frontier, there is a negative relationship between tari¤s and subsequent price growth, and for varieties far from the frontier, there is a positive association. This result shows that the discouragement and escape competition e¤ects appear when using prices instead of the alternative measure of quality proposed by .
In Table 5 , we address issues surrounding omitted variables and endogeneity. First, a potential concern is that …rms are upgrading quality in response to lower tari¤s on intermediate inputs rather than tari¤s on …nal goods. As input tari¤s fall, …rms can access cheaper higher quality inputs, which can lead to higher quality outputs. If tari¤s on intermediate inputs and …nal goods are correlated, this omitted variable could bias our coe¢ cients. In column 1 of Table 5 , we include input tari¤s in the baseline speci…cation and …nd that it has a positive coe¢ cient, but it is statistically insigni…cant. 27 What is important is that the signi…cance and magnitudes of all the other variables are una¤ected by the inclusion of input tari¤s.
Second, if products close to the quality frontier re ‡ect a country's comparative advantage varieties, the observed mechanism underlying the quality upgrading may re ‡ect resource reallocation from a country's comparative disadvantage to its comparative advantage sectors. In Bernard et al. (2007) , liberalizing trade induces an expansion and productivity gain in countries'comparative advantage sectors because resources reallocate across and within sectors. In that model, part of the reallocation is driven by the bilateral nature of the trade liberalization, which expands …rms' market access in the destination countries. Here, we focus on unilateral trade liberalization which increases import competition. Nevertheless, to examine this alternative channel, we control for the (lag) revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of countries' sectors, which we compute at the HS6 level from the UN Comtrade database. Revealed comparative advantage is de…ned as the HS6 share of a country's exports divided by the HS6 share in total world exports. As shown in column 2 of Table 5 , the coe¢ cient on lag RCA is positive and signi…cant. This implies that more rapid quality growth is associated with comparative advantage sectors, as we might expect. However, even after controlling for this additional factor, the baseline results continue to hold.
Third, there may be endogeneity concerns arising from countries possibly liberalizing their industries selectively based on forces that we are unable to observe. For instance, if countries receive productivity shocks that enable them to improve the quality of their products, pressures against liberalizing those markets may subside. To the extent that these shocks are country-speci…c, the country-year …xed e¤ects will control for productivity shocks. Likewise, productivity (or demand) shocks that are common across all varieties within a product will be captured by the product-year …xed e¤ects. However, productivity shocks could be country-industry speci…c. To address this concern, we include the change in a country's total exports to the world for each HS 6-digit industry by year, taken from Comtrade. The change in industry-level exports for each country is a plausible proxy for productivity shocks: higher productivity shocks are likely to be re ‡ected in higher export growth. In column 3 of Table 5 , we see that while the change in exports is positively correlated with quality upgrading, its inclusion leaves the key results unchanged. Moreover, the magnitudes are extremely close to the baseline results reported in column 3 of Table  3 . 28 We further address potential endogeneity concerns by exploiting a speci…c liberalization episode: the ending of textile and clothing (T&C) quotas under the Multi…ber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005. A major breakthrough in the Uruguay Round was the agreement by developed countries to end their stringent quotas on developing countries' T&C exports. While the liberalization episode was anticipated, the quota removal was plausibly exogenous for countries that exported T&C because of the WTO mandate to end the quota regime. 29 In 1995, the U.S. published the HS product schedule to phase out the quotas over ten years. Brambilla, Khandelwal and Schott (2010) show that China's T&C exports surged following MFA quota removals (it was eligible for quota removals after joining the WTO). The surge was most pronounced in the products in which China was "bound"-products in which China's quota …ll-rates exceeded 90 percent. After the quotas were removed, China's exports of bounded products immediately increased by more than 450 percent. Brambilla et al. (2010) show that with few exceptions (notably Bangladesh and India), virtually all countries'T&C exports to the U.S. contracted because of China's export explosion. 30 Thus, China's exports following the end of the MFA represents a substantial increase in product market competition for T&C HS products, and especially in the set of products in which China was bound.
We exploit the MFA episode by restricting our analysis to the T&C products that were covered by the MFA, and we assign an indicator variable, B h , to equal one if China was subject to binding quotas in that product. 31 As show in Brambilla et al. (2010) , product market competition was the most severe in the bound products. We then estimate an analog to the baseline speci…cation in equation (8) on the set of T&C products:
The speci…cation in (9) regresses quality upgrading on product-year and country-year …xed e¤ects, the lag proximity to frontier, and its interaction with B h . 32 We again restrict the analysis to the countries de…ned as having a relatively stronger business climate. Since China only became eligible for quota removals after it entered the WTO in December 2001, we focus on the period from 2000 to 2005. As before, we should observe 1 < 0; varieties that are far from the frontier experience faster growth due to convergence. The coe¢ cient of interest is 2 which captures the di¤erential quality upgrading in bound and unbound products according to a variety's P F . This coe¢ cient should be positive: varieties that are close to the frontier should experience relatively faster quality upgrading in China's bound products. We report the results in column 4 of Table 5 . Consistent with the theory and our earlier evidence, we observe that quality upgrading among high P F varieties is faster in products that faced sti¤er competition over this period. We also run an additional placebo test by including the earlier periods of our sample in column 5. Since China's exports remained constrained by quotas prior to 2000, product market competition should not have increased in the B products in 1990-95 and 1995-00. We check this placebo test by interacting P F and P F B with a PostWTO indicator that takes a value of one in period 2000-05 and a value of zero in periods 1990-95 and 1995-00. The coe¢ cient on the triple interaction term is statistically signi…cant implying that, as shown in the previous column, there is a di¤erential change in quality upgrading across China's bound and unbound products after China's WTO entry. Moreover, there is no statistical di¤erence between quality upgrading across products in the periods before China's WTO entry. These …ndings are entirely consistent with product market competition sti¤ening in the bound products in the …nal period of our sample, but having no di¤erential impact in the earlier years. 33 Thus, the predictions of the model and our baseline results are veri…ed using the MFA shock. A related concern with the baseline speci…cation is that the coe¢ cients on P F ch;t 5 and (P F cht 5 tari¤ cht 5 ) might be downward biased because, all else equal, a high ch;t 5 implies a high P F ch;t 5 but a low ln cht . Following Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), we instrument P F ch;t 5 (and the interactions) with its 5-year lag value. Column 6 of Table 5 shows that the results are robust, with the coe¢ cients on the proximity to frontier and the interaction becoming a little smaller in magnitude (compare with column 3 of Table 3 ). 34 Another way to check that the regressions are not simply picking up mean reversion is to instead use the variety's current period proximity to frontier, P F cht , instead of the lagged measure. 35 We should still …nd the pattern of quality upgrading if the current period measure truly captures a variety's underlying proximity to frontier. Column 7 of Table 5 reports the results. The coe¢ cients on the tari¤ terms have the same signs as the baseline speci…cation. It is not suprising that the coe¢ cient on the interaction is somewhat weaker since the current period measures proxies the lag frontier measure with error (statistically signi…cant at the 15 percent level), but nevertheless, the result demonstrates that the baseline speci…cations are unlikely to be driven solely by mean reversion.
Finally, an alternative source of bias could arise from selection. If a country does not export a particular product, we do not observe the quality of that good. Further, the observation is only included in the estimation if the quality is observed in both periods t and t 5. It is di¢ cult to sign the selection bias since it is likely to depend on how tari¤s a¤ect entry and exit, and where the varieties are located on the PF distribution. For example, suppose lower tari¤s result in a country-product pair exiting from our sample. While its quality change would be missing (the current period quality is not observed), one might expect its quality to have fallen (i.e., its quality-adjusted price rises to the point where no U.S. consumer chooses to import the variety). If the variety was already far away from the frontier, then our coe¢ cient on tari¤s ( 2 ) is biased downwards. If the exiting variety was close to the frontier, then the interaction coe¢ cient ( 3 ) is also biased downwards implying that the estimated coe¢ cient is "too negative". On the other hand, if lower tari¤s result in more varieties entering the sample, then the selection bias implies that our coe¢ cients are biased upwards. This is because while the quality change for entering varieties is missing (because the previous period quality is not observed), entry into our sample can be viewed as a positive change in quality. Thus, for varieties distant from the frontier, our estimate of 2 is biased upwards (that is, it is "too positive"), while for varieties close to the frontier, the baseline estimate of 3 is not negative enough. This makes it di¢ cult to sign the overall bias on both coe¢ cients due to any selection issues. Nonetheless, to address this selection issue, we implement a two-step Heckman correction. For this estimation, we use freight costs that a country would have to incur if it were to export that product. This variable plausibly a¤ects entry and exit decisions into the U.S. export market but does not a¤ect the change in quality. We calculate this potential freight cost by taking the freight cost of the closest neighboring country that does export that product. The …rst stage probit in column 1 of Table 6 shows that the coe¢ cient on the freight variable is negative and signi…cant; this suggests that higher potential freight costs reduce the probability of being in the sample. In the second stage, we include the inverse mills ratio from the …rst stage regression, which is signi…cant, implying that the error terms in both regressions are correlated. However, the results in the second step (column 2) indicate that the main coe¢ cients of interest are unchanged from the baseline speci…cations. Thus, our results remain robust to controlling for potential selection biases. 36
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that there is a signi…cant relationship between import tari¤s and quality upgrading. The direction of the e¤ect depends importantly on how far the product is from the world quality frontier. For products close to the frontier, low tari¤s encourage quality upgrading whereas for products distant from the frontier, low tari¤s have the opposite e¤ect, discouraging quality upgrading. The disaggregated nature of the quality and tari¤ measures enables us to isolate this relationship while controlling for countryyear speci…c e¤ects such as changes in institutions that could be correlated with industry competition measures, or product demand shocks. Our …ndings support the theories by Aghion and Howitt (2005) and ABGHP (2009) that highlight two forces: one, the "escapecompetition" e¤ect that induces a …rm close to the frontier to invest in quality upgrading in order to survive competition from potential new entrants; and two, the "appropriability" e¤ect that discourages …rms distant from the frontier from investing in quality upgrading because they are too far away from the frontier to be able to compete with potential new entrants.
Our results show that support for these theories is strongest in countries with good business climates, a …nding that is perhaps not surprising given that lower tari¤s are unlikely to alter signi…cantly the competitive environments in countries that face many other restrictions on competition. Interestingly, the nonmonotonic relationship between tari¤s and quality upgrading holds for both OECD and non-OECD countries with strong business climates. Thus, our results suggest that a minimum institutional quality, and not simply higher income per capita, is required for the two opposing forces in ABGHP (2009) to operate.
These …ndings have a number of implications for future research. First, the initial distance to the world frontier within industries is important for understanding subsequent industry performance following trade liberalization policies. Second, we have focused exclusively on the e¤ect of import competition on quality upgrading. However, import competition can also a¤ect other forms of innovation, such as investments in technology, research and development, and the introduction of new types of products. These measures of …rm performance would also be interesting avenues to explore. Countries above the median DB in our sample are: Australia*, Austria*, Belgium/Luxembourg*, Canada*, Chile, Denmark*, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Hong Kong, Ireland*, Italy*, Japan*, Malaysia, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Norway*, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain*, Sweden*, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey*, and UK*. Countries below the median DB in our sample are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece*, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal*, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Stars denote OECD countries. Non-OECD Indicator interacted with (4) Notes: Table reports regression results of change in (log) quality of a variety on the lag HS6 level tariff faced in the origin country, the varieties lag proximity to frontier and the interaction. Column 1 reports quality growth on tariffs. Column 2 introduces country-year fixed effects. Column 3 reports the baseline specification with the interaction between proximity to frontier and tariffs. Column 4 estimates separate coefficients for the OECD and non-OECD countries (the OECD dummy is not reported). All regressions include product-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as one country because of its common trade policy). Significance * .10 **.05 *** .01.
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Variables
(1) (2) (3) Regressors OECD Indicator interacted with Column 1 reports regression results of change in (log) quality of a variety on the lag HS6 level tariff faced in the origin country, the varieties lag proximity to frontier and the interaction, with each coefficient interacted with a dummy variable if the country is above (HDB) or below (LDB) the median Doing Business value. Panel two introduces an additional interaction if the country is an OECD country. Column 2a reports the OECD interactions and column 2b reports the non-OECD interactions; note that these coefficients are estimated in a single regression. Column 3 reports the baseline specification for just countries above the median Doing Business values. See footnote of Table 1 for a list of the country classificatoins. All regressions include product-year and country-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as one country because of the common trade policy). Significance * .10 **.05 *** .01.
131,257
OECD Indicator interactions
Non-OECD Indicator interactions All Countries
HDB Countries
Only yes yes 0.58 Table reports regression results of change in (log) quality of a variety on the lag HS6 level tariff faced in the origin country, the varieties lag proximity to frontier and the interaction along with additional controls. Column 1 excludes observations with a proximity to frontier equal to one. Column 2 removes the top two qualities from each product and re-defines the proximity to frontier measure (that is, the third highest quality becomes the frontier). Column 3 re-defines the frontier measure using just the sample of HDB countries. Column 4 uses quality measures from estimating equation (5) excluding China and then rerunning the baseline regression (8). Column 5 uses the change in the percentile of the variety's quality, rather than the actual quality measure, as the dependent variable. Column 6 uses unit values as the proxy for quality, and so it regresses the change in unit values on tariffs, a unit value proximity to frontier measure, and the interaction. All regressions include country-year and product-year fixed effects, and are run on the set of high DB countries. Standard errors clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as one country because of the common tariff). Significance * .10 **.05 *** .01. Table reports regression results of change in (log) quality of a variety on the lag HS6 level tariff faced in the origin country, the varieties lag proximity to frontier and the interaction along with additional controls. Column 1 includes lag input tariffs as a control. Column 2 includes countries' lag revealed comparative advantage as a control. Column 3 includes a measure of a country's HS6-level world export growth. Column 4 restricts the analysis to 2000-2005 and to products that were subject to quotas under the MFA. These products are taken from Brambilla et al. (2010) . The "B" dummy that takes a value of one if China's fill rate exceeded 90 percent in 1991 for that product; fill rate information is also taken from Brambilla et al. (2010) . Column 5 includes all periods and interacts PF X B with a dummy "PostWTO" that takes a value of one in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . We suppress the coeffient on PF * PostWTO for readibility purposes (the coefficient is not statistically significant). Column 6 instruments the lag proximity to frontier with the previous period lag PF measure (i.e., the lag-lag proximity to frontier). Using the lag-lag PF measure is why the number of observations falls, and the low R-squared is because the data were de-meaned prior to running the regression. Column 7 replaces runs the baseline specification, but replaces the variety's lag proximity to frontier with its current period proximity to frontier. All regressions include country-year and product-year fixed effects and are run on the set of high DB countries. Standard errors clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as one country because of the common tariff). Significance * .10 **.05 *** .01. (1)
Notes: Table reports a Heckman selection correction for the baseline specification. Column 1 reports the first-stage probit regression of the probability of being observed in the sample on the (log) potential freight measure, country-year fixed effects and HS2-year fixed effects. Column 2 includes the inverse mills ratio obtained from column 1 to correct for selection. The specifications are run on the set of high DB countries, and column 2 includes country-year and product-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as one country because of the common tariff). Significance * .10 **.05 *** .01. 
